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California and the Future of
Partial Match DNA Investigations
by JENNY CHOI*
Introduction
In 1987, Florida prosecutors advanced criminal investigations by
successfully convicting a man for the first time using DNA testing in
the United States.' Eight years later, the highly publicized O.J.
Simpson murder trial catapulted the method into the mainstream.
Today, investigators routinely use DNA testing to both convict and
exonerate suspects by comparing the alleged perpetrator's DNA to
evidence found at a crime scene. The increasing familiarity with the
science, as well as its advancements, has led to broader uses. In 2008,
California became the first state to expand the parameters of DNA
testing and actively search for "partial matches,"2 an aggressive
approach that the public has both applauded and criticized.' Amidst
its controversy, this method led to the arrest of Lonnie David
Franklin Jr. in July 2010. Also known as the "Grim Sleeper,"
Franklin allegedly murdered at least ten women over the last twenty-
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; Bachelor of Arts, Political Science 2007, University of Southern California. I would
like to express gratitude to Professor Roger Park for his guidance and insight in the
development of this article. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their
constant support.
1. See generally Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
2. Jessica Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based
on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 21-22 (2010). Although the Denver
District Attorney's office was the first to use familial searching in the United States,
California is the first to "vigorously pursue[] familial searching as a matter of policy rather
than happenstance," making it the leader in the field. Id. at 22. Colorado and Virginia are
the only other states to use familial DNA testing. Press release, Office of the Governor
Robert F. McDonnell, Governor McDonnell Announces Virginia Department of Forensic
Science to Begin Using Familial DNA Searches in Virginia (Mar. 21, 2011),
http://governor.virginia.gov/news/viewRelease.cfm?id=648.
3. Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, State Offers Police Extra DNA Tool, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 26,2008), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2008/apr/26/local/me-dna26.
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4five years. While many consider his capture a success story, there are
still concerns over the expanding role of DNA in criminal
investigations. This paper will explore the evolution of DNA testing
and consider its future potential. Parts II and III focus on California's
current approach to partial match searches. Part IV examines the
constitutional, social, and policy issues surrounding this practice.
Finally, Part V proposes formal guidelines that would provide more
guidance to the application of this new and controversial technology.
The guidelines serve as a compromise to appease concerns such as
privacy, constitutional rights, and costs, while maximizing its potential
utility.
I. Back to Basics
A. Biology of DNA
There are approximately 100 trillion cells in the human body.'
Each cell has a nucleus containing chromosomes, which hold all the
information necessary to produce a human body.' Each human
normally has forty-six chromosomes.7  Forty-four are arranged in
pairs and numbered one through twenty-two in descending order of
size.8 The remaining two determine gender: "XX" for females or
"XY" for males.9  Along each chromosome, genes lie at various
positions and are known as loci." They are made up of
deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA").n Among humans, at least 99.5% of
DNA are the same, which accounts for common features that make
us an identifiable species.12 The remaining bit is unique to an
individual, with the exception of identical twins.13 This 0.5%
determines genetic characteristics, growth, and development. 14
4. Jennifer Steinhauer, 'Grim Sleeper' Arrest Fans Debate on DNA Use, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/us/09sleeper.html
?_r=1.
5. GERALD SHEINDLIN, GENETIC FINGERPRINTING: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
DNA 46 (1996).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 48.
9. Id.
10. DAVID KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 40 (2010).
11. SHEINDLIN, supra note 5, at 46.
12. KAYE, supra note 10, at 42.
13. Id.
14. SHEINDLIN, supra note 5, at 45.
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One DNA molecule contains about three billion base pairs that
are shaped like a double helix." Each base can be one of four
possibilities: Adenine (A), Guanine (G), Cytosine (C), or Thymine
(T)." Because of the difference in their chemical natures, A and T
can only bond with each other and C and G can only bond together."
Therefore, the only possible combinations for the base pairs are A-T,
T-A, C-G, and G-C.'"
Base pairs often repeat themselves along the DNA molecule.'9
When a sequence of four or five base pairs repeats itself, they are
known as short tandem repeats ("STRs").20 The full sequences are
called alleles. 2' For example, the sequence TACG may repeat itself
five times: TACGTACGTACGTACGTACG or ("TACG").
Genetic differences, such as eye color, are results of variations among
the alleles.2 Each number of repeats is a different allele, and they are
often referred to as "markers" because the length of each STR is
inherited from either parent.23 Each STR is on a "locus," or particular
* 24
spot on a specific chromosome.
B. Keeping Track
In 1990, the FBI began a project to coordinate DNA collection
and evaluation.25 The DNA Identification Act of 1994 authorized the
FBI to establish the National DNA Index System ("NDIS").26 Today,
NDIS is one part of the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"), a
database used by law enforcement throughout the United States and
in over thirty other countries.27 CODIS also collects and incorporates
15. Id. at 46.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. KAYE, supra note 10, at 42.
20. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch
Offenders' Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 248, 249 (2006).
21. KAYE, supra note 10, at 42.
22. SHEINDLIN, supra note 5, at 49.
23. Greely et al., supra note 20, at 250.
24. Id.
25. CODIS Brochure, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/lab/codis/codisbrochure (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (West 2011).
27. CODIS Brochure, supra note 25.
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profiles from state DNA index systems ("SDIS") and local DNA
index systems ("LDIS").&
CODIS collects DNA profiles from convicted offenders,
arrestees, crime scene evidence, missing persons, biological relatives
of missing persons, and unidentified human remains.2 9 Though each
agency must conform to the minimum standards that the FBI has laid
out, each state determines its own policies. 0 For example, while some
states permit DNA sampling upon arrest, other states require that an
offender be convicted.
Each profile is based off of thirteen core loci, or twenty-six
alleles.31 In order to get a hit, evidence must match a profile at all
thirteen loci. As of January 2011, NDIS contains over 9,654,667
profiles and has resulted in over 136,400 hits.32 In California alone,
there have been 12,777 hits from among the 1,358,579 profiles.33
II. California DNA Procedure
In response to the increasing availability of resources in criminal
investigations, state legislatures began to pass statutes to explicitly
permit and regulate DNA testing.
A. Origins
Though laws varied among states, original statutes generally
required individuals convicted of sex offenses and other violent
felonies to submit DNA samples on the basis that these offenders
were likely to recidivate.- Over the years, many states added to the
list of crimes and justified these changes by claiming that if these
criminals were not apprehended, they would be more likely to
commit other, more violent crimes." California clarified existing law
28. Levels of the Database, DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/
levels (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
29. CODIS Brochure, supra note 25.
30. NDIS Procedures and Administration, DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/dna-
databases/ndis/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
31. CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
32. The NDIS has 9,298,324 offender profiles and 356,343 forensic profiles. CODIS-
NDIS Statistics, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
33. Id.
34. Mark Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the
Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127,128 (2001).
35. Id.
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by introducing the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and
Data Bank Act of 1998 ("DNA Databank Act"). As originally
passed, the DNA Databank Act limited sampling to nine felonies and
allowed police to compare a person's DNA with crime scene DNA
only when that person was a suspect. Amendments in 2000 and 2002
added to the list of felonies and broadened the scope to allow
comparisons among those who were not yet suspects.38
B. The Voters Speak
In 2004, California voters approved Proposition 69, further
pushing the boundaries of DNA collection. Officially entitled the
"DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act,"
the proposition mandates warrantless compulsory sampling for those
convicted for any felony, arson, or misdemeanor sexual offense,
including retroactive application to previously convicted prisoners
and parolees.39 Proposition 69 also requires sampling for those
arrested for felony sex offenses or murder.'
Though there have been many cases in which convicted felons
have challenged the constitutionality of DNA collection, courts
throughout the country have unanimously rejected such claims.41
Among other reasons, they emphasize the government interest as
overwhelmingly more important than the privacy rights of convicts.
To that extent, courts have firmly established that convicts have a
diminished right to privacy, which permits the collection of their
DNA.42
The nation is almost evenly split on whether to collect DNA
samples from arrestees. Although President Obama has publicly
endorsed this practice,43 California is one of only twenty-four states
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 295 (Deering 2010).
37. Robert Berlet, A Step Too Far: Due Process and DNA Collection in California
After Proposition 69,40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1495 (2007).
38. Id.
39. Proposition 69 (DNA), CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATr'ORNEY
GEN., http://www.ag.ca.gov/bfs/pdf/sec-state-fullversion-prop69.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2011).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., People v. King, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1363 (2000).
42. Id. at 1375.
43. America's Most Wanted (Fox television broadcast Mar. 3, 2010) (transcript on file
with The White House).
that implement this practice." Though the trend is growing, people
continue to fight against it. In 2009, Lily Haskell and Reginald Ento
were arrested for separate unrelated crimes.45 They both submitted
DNA samples, but neither was prosecuted.46 Haskell and Ento
brought charges against the government asserting that arrestees are
distinguishable from convicted offenders and entitled to a much
higher expectation of privacy.47 While the court agreed with this
rationale, it also pointed out that arrestees have a "lesser privacy
interest than the general population."" After balancing other factors,
the court ultimately upheld compulsory DNA sampling of arrestees.49
III. Familial Testing
With perfect match searches virtually uncontestable, and the
scope of such testing enlarged to include a greater portion of the
population, investigators sought to expand methods of testing.
A. DNA Testing Revamped
DNA testing was innovated once again with familial searching.
Following the United Kingdom's lead, former California Attorney
General Jerry Brown implemented the method as a matter of policy."o
Rather than searching for a complete match, authorities look for
DNA profiles that share some, but not all alleles." In California, the
minimum standard is currently set at fifteen alleles.52 The resulting
profiles are known as "pivots."53 Because biological relatives share
similar profiles, these pivots may lead investigators toward the actual
44. Chris Sullivan, State Wants to Collect Your DNA on Arrest, Not Conviction, CTR.
FOR GENETICS AND SOC'Y (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?
id=5583.
45. Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187,1192 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1196.
48. Id. at 1197.
49. Id. at 1203.
50. Gabel, supra note 2, at 22.
51. Joel Rubin, Grim Sleeper: How LAPD followed the DNA to an arrest, L.A. TIMES
(July 8, 2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/07/how-dna-led-to-the-arrest-of-
the-grim-sleeper.html.
52. Memorandum from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney Gen. of Cal. to All Cal.
Law Enforcement Agencies and District Attorney's Offices, DNA Partial Match (Crime
Scene DNA Profile to Offender) Policy (Apr. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Cal. Att'y Gen.
Memo], available athttp://ag.ca.gov/cms-attachments/press/pdfs/nl548-08-bfs-01.pdf.
53. Gabel, supra note 2, at 18.
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suspect.54 Police can interview the pivot or examine family members."
Once a suspect is identified, police can obtain a warrant to extract the
suspect's DNA, or they can gather it through abandoned items." The
suspect's sample is then compared to that from the crime scene.
According to Brown, only DNA samples from convicted felons have
been used in the database search," and this method will only be used
when all other leads have been exhausted." As of now, the FBI does
not actively conduct familial searches the way that some of its state
counterparts do, including California investigators."o However, labs
will occasionally observe partial matches, and the FBI has authorized
their release on an interim basis, as well as made recommendations in
addressing the matches."
B. The Big Break
When traditional DNA testing in the hunt for the Grim Sleeper
yielded no results, Los Angeles police took advantage of the new
technology and broadened their search.62 Among the list of 200
potential relatives, five profiles shared a common genetic marker at
fifteen locations. 63 Knowing that the suspect was a man, the scientists
tested all 200 to see if any shared a Y chromosome with the crime
scene DNA.' A single match, among the top five, came from a man
who had recently been arrested.6' However, since he was too young
to be the killer, investigators turned their attention to his father.
Four days of non-stop surveillance yielded a discarded pizza crust,
54. Id.
55. Dolan & Felch, supra note 3.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Hector Becerra et al., Grim Sleeper: 'This Terror Has Finally Come to an End,'
Mayor Villaraigosa Says, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2010), http://latimesblogs.1atimes.com/
lanow/2010/07/grim-sleeper-this-terror-has-finally-come-to-an-end-mayor-says.html.
59. Dolan & Felch, supra note 3.
60. CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 31.
61. Id.
62. Grim Sleeper Arrest Marks Big Advance for Controversial DNA Evidence, L.A.
TIMEs (July 10, 2010) [hereinafter Arrest Marks Big Advance), http://latimes
blogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/07/grim-sleeper-arrest-marks-big-advance-for-controversial-
dna-evidence.html.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
fork, napkin, and a drinking glass. They took the "abandoned"
materials to the lab.' When the lab results confirmed a complete
match the following day, police arrested Franklin."
C. Lightning Strikes Twice
Most recently, Santa Cruz investigators arrested Elvis Lorenzo
Garcia as a suspect in a three-year-old rape and robbery.o In March
2008, a man sexually assaulted a woman at the coffee shop where she
worked and robbed the store on his way out.71 The close community
banded together to discuss safety and set up a reward fund, but when
the search led nowhere, police requested a familial search.72  In
November 2010, the California Department of Justice linked the
crime scene evidence to Garcia's father. When his father was ruled
out as a suspect, police kept close watch on Garcia until January 2011,
when they retrieved a hairnet and bottle from his trash.74 Garcia's
DNA was a match, and police obtained arrest and search warrants.
D. Debate
These recent successes bolster advocates' arguments in favor of
expanding the use of DNA testing, but opponents point to the
possibility of error. The FBI asked the Scientific Working Group on
DNA Analysis Methods ("SWGDAM") to create an ad hoc
committee and examine partial DNA matches. In its
recommendation, the SWGDAM found that there was little
67. Id.
68. As will be discussed later in greater detail, the collection of items discarded in
public places is not a constitutional violation because there is no expectation of privacy in
abandoned things. Infra Part 0.
69. Arrest Marks Big Advance, supra note 62.
70. Stephen Baxter, Rare, Familial DNA Used in Case of Rape and Robbery at Santa
Cruz Coffee Shop, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.santacruz
sentinel.com/ci_17618326?source=most-emailed.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNICATIONS,
SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON DNA ANALYSIS METHODS AD HOC COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FBI DIRECTOR ON THE "INTERIM PLAN FOR THE
RELEASE OF INFORMATION IN THE EVENT OF A 'PARTIAL MATCH' AT NDIS," (Oct.
2009) [hereinafter SWGDAM Recommendations], available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/oct2009/Zbackup/standard-guidlines/swgdam.html.
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probative value in using current CODIS searching rules and
algorithms because of the occasional occurrence of siblings sharing
alleles at all thirteen loci, and the increased chance of shared alleles
within such a large database." However, they do not discount the
potential value in maintaining local and state databases." With fewer
profiles and limited geographical reach, results are less likely to result
in a false positive.7 ' Familial searches may be useful if there is a
parent-child relationship between the pivot and the suspect, where
the genetic relationship is the strongest. However, as the ties weaken,
so do the genetic connections. While critics inquire into the
possibility of fruitless searches and potential implication of innocent
people, proponents point out that high matches are not as common as
some presume. Among Caucasians, a father and child will share on
average 15.7 out of 26 CODIS alleles, and siblings will share on
average 16.7 alleles." These numbers drop to 8.7 for two unrelated
individuals." Of course, the success of any search is contingent upon
the existence of the perpetrator's profile and/or the profile of a family
member in the database.
IV. Constitutional Concerns
A. Fourth Amendment
Opponents have criticized DNA collection of arrestees and
familial testing on various constitutional grounds. The Fourth
Amendment seems to carry the most weight, guaranteeing the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search and seizures," and that "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."" The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as establishing rules and
presumptions limiting the government's ability to intrude into an
individual's personal privacy." In proving that an action violates the
Fourth Amendment, the action must: (1) Constitute a search or
seizure, and (2) be unreasonable.8 As previously mentioned,
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Greely et al., supra note 20, at 253.
81. Id.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 329 (2001).
84. Gabel, supra note 2, at 34.
collecting samples from convicted offenders is no longer an issue, and
many courts have upheld statutes compelling DNA from arrestees of
certain crimes. However, courts have not yet considered the greater
implications with the advent of familial searches. That issue carries
privacy concerns in itself for the pivot and the suspect. While isolated
parts of the DNA network may pass constitutional muster, the
totality of the approach foreshadows unpalatable consequences.
1. Is Compelling a DNA Sample a Search or Seizure?
A search becomes subject to constitutional scrutiny when the
government intrudes beyond public aspects.8 A blood or urine
sample, because it is an intrusion into a person's body, is a plain
example of a search." Other personal, physical samples such as
handwriting exemplars have no such expectation of privacy."
In California, eligible arrestees and convicted offenders submit
DNA samples using buccal swabs." A buccal swab is much less
intrusive than a blood sample, as it merely involves collecting cells
from the inside cheek of a person's mouth. Previous holdings that
"DNA tests are analogous to fingerprinting for identification
purposes," lead to the argument that non-invasive methods of
obtaining DNA do not implicate the Fourth Amendment."
Nevertheless, courts have held that a swab constitutes a search
because it "unquestionably implicates the right to personal security."'
DNA is inherently different from fingerprints because of the
information that can be extracted from it, including identifying and
potentially implicating family members.
2. Unreasonableness
If an action constitutes a search or seizure, it may still be
constitutional if it is reasonable. Courts must balance the degree of
intrusion into an individual's privacy against the government interest
85. Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 34, at 135.
86. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
87. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (holding that handwriting and voice
characteristics are not meant to be private and therefore do not qualify for protection
under the Fourth Amendment).
88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 296.1 (Deering 2011) (overturned in part by People v. Buza,
197 Cal. App. 4th 1424 (2011); at time of print under review by the California Supreme
Court).
89. Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 34, at 155.
90. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004).
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at stake." For example, even though blood samples constitute a
search, the Court has established its reasonableness by emphasizing
the minimal intrusion in light of government interests.2
The government has asserted numerous justifications to support
its DNA collection practices. First, it has suggested that the ability to
profile will have a deterrent effect.93  The courts have notably
acknowledged that there is a real interest in reducing recidivism and a
need to combat that issue.' However, the courts have not explained
how DNA profiling will affect a potential criminal's decision to
reoffend or why it would then be necessary to collect DNA from
those on death row." They point out that the government has an
objective to investigate and prosecute similar classes of unsolved and
future crimes.' The government argues that establishing a common
database can help to solve cold cases or even exonerate innocent
suspects." Fingerprints are easily covered by wearing gloves and can
enable a criminal to leave no traces of evidence. On the other hand,
because DNA "permeates blood, semen False . .. saliva False ... hair
and epidermal cells," it is incredibly difficult for a criminal to leave
unscathed. 8 Finally, DNA testing could prevent wrongful convictions
and exonerate those who were innocently convicted."
The majority of these justifications presume that the government
has an interest in implicating or exonerating reoffenders. It will be
interesting to see how the court will analyze the reasonableness of
partial match searches. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
governmental purpose of general crime control is not a Constitutional
"primary purpose."'" Traditional DNA testing is a permissible
method of crime control because it helps law enforcement "determine
91. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
92. Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 34, at 141 (blood samples are minimal
intrusions because of legal requirements such as entering the military or applying for a
marriage license, or voluntary actions such as donating blood).
93. Kincade, 379 F.3d. at 838.
94. Id.
95. Women on death row challenged the California DNA Act claiming it violated
their privacy rights. The court recognized the plainitffs' constitutional interests, but
rejected them citing other states that have upheld mandatory DNA collection from
offenders. See generally Alfaro v. Terhune, 98 Cal. App. 4th 492 (2002).
96. Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 34, at 143.
97. Id. See also Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
98. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839.
99. Id. at 869 (Gould, J., concurring).
100. See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
whether specific individuals have committed particular crimes."'O In
contrast, a partial match search involves "trawling" for profiles of a
potential genetic relative, not an actual suspect. Furthermore, the
subsequent use of an offender's genetic material in partial matching
has nothing to do with the circumstances of the offender's conviction
for which the sample was compelled." The government will have to
find a way to justify this fishing expedition with a legitimate purpose.
3. "Special Needs" Exception
Courts have relaxed probable cause and reasonable suspicion
under the "special needs" exception.0 3 In his concurrence in New
Jersey v. T. L. 0., Justice Blackmun stated that courts may substitute a
balancing test of privacy interests against law enforcement objectives
in "exceptional circumstances" where warrant and probable cause
requirements are "impracticable."" The Ninth Circuit has used a
similar exception and applied the "totality of the circumstances."'0a If
familial testing is used in narrow and extraordinary circumstances,
then it is more likely that the balance will fall in favor of its use.
Some believe that in applying a balancing test, a court should not just
"consider[] the defendant ... but also the potential future threats to
him and others that this technology poses."'" Therefore, even if the
public benefits outweigh an individual's privacy, it may not outweigh
the rights of the investigated group."
B. Fourteenth Amendment
There may also be potential claims under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."'"
101. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 857.
102. Gabel, supra note 2, at 37.
103. Daniel Grimm, The Demographics of Genetic Surveillance: Familial DNA Testing
and the Hispanic Community, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1190 (2007).
104. New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
105. Kincade, 379 F.3d. at 838.
106. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 309, 344 (2010).
107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
[Vol. 39:3724 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Spring 2012] FUTURE OF PARTIAL MATCH DNA INVESTIGATIONS 725
1. Equal Protection Clause
Familial DNA testing may have a disparate impact on certain
racial groups.'" The African-American community has experienced a
well-recognized history of disproportionately high arrest and
conviction rates, which has in turn led to its overrepresentation in
databases."o Familial DNA testing may "exacerbate the actual and
apparent disparities" by creating a greater probability that a partial
match exists."
There are similar consequences for the Hispanic community.
First, Hispanics are increasingly experiencing the same input
problem."2 Coupled with the fact that they are the demographic
group with the highest rate of natural population growth, "a Hispanic
defendant is likely, on average, to lead investigators relying on
familial testing to a higher number of genetic relatives than if the
profile had been obtained from a non-Hispanic person.""'
Interestingly, no articles have mentioned the disparate impact on
males versus females. The majority of the total correctional
population is male."4 Thus, it would be logical to assume that partial
match searches would affect males at a greater rate than females,
especially with the additional Y-STR testing that intentionally targets
male relatives. Yet these critics are much more concerned with
possible unintended consequences on racial groups.
Despite these arguments, legal analysts consistently believe that
these claims will carry little weight in court."' In order for an Equal
Protection claim to be viable, there must be intentional
discrimination."' Current California and federal standards for partial
match searches show no indication of intentionally targeting
particular racial groups. In fact, the FBI has recommended protocol
to implement searches that equally target each of the four major
ethnic groups.'
109. See generally Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases,
109 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2010); Grimm, supra note 103.
110. Grimm, supra note 103, at 1165.
111. Murphy, supra note 109, at 321.
112. Grimm, supra note 103, at 1165.
113. Id.
114. In 2009, 82% of the total correctional population was male. LAUREN GLAZE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2009 (Dec. 2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus09.pdf.
115. Grimm, supra note 103, at 1186; Murphy, supra note 109, at 331.
116. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 (1976).
117. SWGDAM Recommendations, supra note 76.
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2. Due Process
The United States Supreme Court has held that due process
requires a hearing when a person has been deprived of property."'
As previously discussed, extracting a DNA sample is a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment."9 This hearing must be meaningful and
adequate to protect the right at issue.120  The government has
succeeded in defending DNA extraction without a hearing under the
exception of an extraordinary situation with a valid governmental
interest.12 However, there has not yet been a ruling on whether that
government interest is still valid in retaining the sample without a
proper due process hearing after the suspect is cleared of charges or
acquitted.
For those who seek to remove their DNA from the California
database, Proposition 69 redesigned the expungement process.
Judges have complete discretion, and denials are unreviewable. 22
The practical effect is that this power makes the removal process
arduous and allows the database to retain DNA indefinitely without
legal cause.123 Even if a petition for expungement is successful, there
is no way to guarantee that a lab will comply with the court order.124
V. Beyond the Law
While constitutional issues alone justify scrutiny of any process,
social and policy concerns should also weigh in the discussion.
A. Social Concerns
There are a myriad of social and policy concerns arising out of
familial DNA testing. First, there is the worry that these searches
erroneously embody the concept that criminality is biological. 125 Erin
Murphy argues that by conducting partial match searches, "we would
118. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also City of Los Angeles v. David,
538 U.S. 715 (2003).
119. Supra Part IV.a.1.
120. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 80 (1972)).
121. The Court has also held that an unauthorized, intentional deprivation of property
does not violate one's due process if there is a meaningful post remedy available. See
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(c)(1) (Deering 2011).
123. Berlet, supra note 37, at 1484.
124. Id. at 1496.
125. Murphy, supra note 109, at 304.
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have to believe as a matter of criminology or sociology that the
relatives of criminal offenders are more likely to be criminal
offenders themselves than persons without relatives that have been
convicted of crime."1 26 This may be overreaching and distorting the
intent of those doing the search. In Murphy's analysis, she
backwardly assumes that investigators are conducting partial match
searches because they believe that a relative, if existent, will be in the
system. The way the California criteria are currently applied,
however, suggests no such motivation. Rather, these searches are
only to occur when "[a]ll other leads and attempts to identify the
source have been exhausted,"127 implying that when there is a dead
end a partial match search is better than giving up entirely. Daniel
Grimm more poignantly points out that "inferring the possibility of
wrongdoing through genetic identity will stigmatize some groups than
others . . . [which] creates the possibility of entrenching stereotypes
that correlate race and ethnicity with criminality." 128 While this may
carry some weight, it is still based on outsiders' ignorance rather than
the actual intent of such searches. The opinions of uninformed
people should not outweigh the realities and benefits of the system.
Greater, perhaps more legitimate, concerns involve potential
detrimental effects on families who may learn distasteful information
throughout the course of an investigation. There may be family
members who are unaware of their relative's criminality.129 Even in
families where criminality of a relative is no secret, investigations
pursuant to partial matches may threaten the "great societal interest
in maintaining and promoting intact, healthy, family units."m Many
families have already suffered emotionally or financially while a
relative underwent the criminal justice system, either as supporters or
as victims. Subsequent investigations may rekindle painful memories
and add additional stress onto perhaps already strained relationships,
regardless of whether their relative turns out to be the ultimate
suspect.
Also, there is the possibility that familial searches may lead to
the discovery of previously unknown genetic relationships, or lack
126. Id. at 305-06.
127. Cal. Att'y Gen. Memo, supra note 52.
128. Grimm, supra note 103, at 1194.
129. Murphy, supra note 109, at 319.
130. Id. at 321.
131. Id. at 319.
thereof.132 For example, a child may find out that he or she was
adopted, or a man may discover that he is not the biological father of
a child he previously believed to be his. But this situation will present
itself in rare cases, and even then the information is only harmful if
the investigators communicate it."' There likely is a greater
probability of a family finding out through other sources than through
familial testing, especially if it is rarely used, as suggested. Even so,
the benefits of catching a high-profile suspect in light of no other
leads would arguably outweigh the potential negative consequences
of interfering with family links. While critics are quick to point out
the potential evils, they offer no suggestions on how to improve the
system to minimize the risks other than to forgo the use of this
technology altogether. Their comments are valid and should be
considered, but their worries are too speculative and attenuated to
disband such a beneficial tool.
B. Policy Concerns
Beyond the effects on the family unit, there are concerns
regarding the methods that investigators employ after targeting
pivots. The Attorney General has not provided any guidelines in
conducting an investigation other than establishing procedures for
collecting biological information. Once labs have created a short list
of a suspect's potential relatives, they have no direction or regulation
for subsequent steps.' One concern is the cost of following-up on
leads. Law enforcement is unlikely to pursue leads if there are an
enormous number of leads, and more likely if there are few. In the
Grim Sleeper case, investigators were lucky enough to narrow down
the suspect pool to one solid lead and catch him within days.
However, with no further guidelines, it is difficult to foresee how
investigators will decide when their case is compelling enough. Henry
Greely points out that such discretion may be even more clouded
during a high profile case such as "a political assassination, a terrorist
attack, or a notorious murder.""' Arguably, in such cases it may be
worth devoting extra attention to the hunt. But that still does not
address the cost of possibly extensive searching and interviewing of
132. Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in
Forensic Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
263 (2006).
133. Greely et al., supra note 20, at 255.
134. See Cal. Att'y Gen. Memo, supra note 52.
135. Greely et al., supra note 20, at 253.
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suspects and their relatives.'- If not a bright line, there must be at
least some statutory guidance to ensure that the state's resources are
used effectively. Even when Santa Cruz investigators narrowed their
investigation to a single suspect, they spent months following Garcia
before arresting him."'
Another concern is that investigators may become overconfident
with leads, creating a risk of confirmation bias.138 Suggestive genetic
evidence may dominate and shape the course of any subsequent
investigation so it inevitably taints the results.'39 An exact match
creates a similar scenario of creating a high level of confidence, but
the greater probability that the suspect is the perpetrator decreases
the likelihood of a false positive, and legitimizes the risk. 40 On the
other hand, the weaker genetic certainty creates a greater risk.
California has already partially addressed this issue by setting a
minimum threshold of 16 STR alleles.14' By requiring a greater
number of matches, the probability of a true genetic relationship
rises, thereby diminishing the risk of such bias.
Even if investigations are conducted "properly,"'42 there are
concerns regarding the appropriateness of using CODIS given the
discrepancies in DNA collection. As discussed previously, states
disagree on whether to include profiles of arrestees.'43 This is not an
immediate concern for California since it utilizes one of the most
expansive methods of DNA collection, but the massive size of
California's database could potentially impact other states with more
restrictive procedures. For example, Colorado allows partial match
searches'" but not DNA samples from arresteesl" so when an
investigator runs a partial match search with crime scene evidence
136. Id.
137. Baxter, supra note 70.
138. Murphy, supra note 109, at 310.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 312.
141. Cal. Att'y Gen. Memo, supra note 52.
142. The word "properly" here is ambiguous because the absence of any guidelines
makes any assessment difficult.
143. Supra Part II.a.
144. P. Solomon Banda, Family DNA Debate: Colorado at Ground Zero of Controversial
Forensic Technique, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/02/09/family-dna-use-debate-col_n_455472.html.
145. State Laws on DNA Data Banks Qualifying Offenses, Others Who Must
Provide Sample, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/CivilandCriminalJustice/StateLawsonDNADataBanks
/tabid/12737/Default.aspx.
through CODIS, it may be compared to California's arrestees. Now,
Colorado is actively using, and thus implicitly condoning, techniques
beyond its statutory limitations. Similarly, local databases are
unregulated by the more stringent rules of national and state
databases.'46 A simple way to address this could be to limit the scope
of searches to allow comparisons of databases with equal or more
stringent parameters. However, this would be difficult to regulate,
and even then it would likely impede the effectiveness of the system,
rendering it useless. Overall, this issue has merited relatively minor
attention in light of other larger concerns, but as the discussion grows,
there may be greater attention.
The Attorney General's Memorandum delineates specific
procedures regarding any DNA collection from pivots.47 It states in
part that such samples must be knowingly and voluntarily made
without the use of "threat, pressure, duress, or coercion of any
kind.. . whether (i) direct or indirect, (ii) express or implied, or (iii)
physical or psychological."' Not surprisingly, there are many
skeptics who question how closely law enforcement will abide by
these regulations given their zeal for solving what is presumably a
high profile, and otherwise cold, case. Even if the law does not
compel pivots to submit to any requests, pivots may still comply "due
to ignorance or because they feel they have no real choice." 49
The most problematic issues involve the retention of biological
information. California requires all pivots' samples and records to be
destroyed after testing.5 o But given the lack of oversight and
accountability of laboratories, there is no way to know for sure
whether samples were properly purged. This is especially
troublesome for the arrestees whose samples were compelled
pursuant to law, but who were exonerated or never charged. Some
localities and states maintain "offline" DNA databanks with samples
from victims or suspects who were never charged with a crime.
Even with pious intent, lack of resources creates obstacles in efficient
execution. California labs have consistently dealt with a backlog of
146. Ellen Nakashima, From DNA of Family, a Tool to Make Arrests, WASH. POST,
Apr. 21,2008, at A-1.
147. Cal. Att'y Gen. Memo, supra note 52.
148. Id.
149. Suter, supra note 106, at 344.
150. Cal. Att'y Gen. Memo, supra note 52.
151. Nakashima, supra note 146.
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DNA samples, 5 2 and they are likely more concerned with getting
samples into the database in the hopes of getting hits than in
removing a single profile.
C. Suspect and Pivot Privacy Rights
When investigators narrow down a suspect, they can obtain his
or her DNA sample in one of two ways: Obtain a search warrant or
collect "abandoned" DNA. A warrant may not be issued without
probable cause. Probable cause exists when "there are reasonably
trustworthy facts which, given the totality of the circumstances, are
sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that items should
constitute fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime."" The
question then becomes, is a partial match in itself enough to
constitute probable cause or must there be corroborating evidence?
Currently, there is no consensus among states using familial searching
as to what is the minimum requirement."'
If investigators choose to bypass a warrant, they may attempt to
collect DNA stealthily by collecting "abandoned" items. The
Supreme Court has held that there is no "expectation of privacy" in
trash placed outside of the home for collection notwithstanding the
intimate items and information that may be contained therein.""'
While scavenging leftover pizza crusts of a narrowly drawn suspect
does not seem problematic, there are more disturbing scenarios.
When it comes to pivots, the guidelines are broad. The Attorney
General's Memorandum outlines proper methods in collecting
voluntary samples, but it is silent on surreptitious collection.'56 In
2005, law enforcement apprehended Dennis Rader, a highly elusive
serial killer known through his modus operandi: BTK, for Bind
Torture Kill."' In one of the earliest uses of familial testing in the
152. In January 2011, 17,303 samples were added, 17,999 profiles were uploaded to
CODIS, and only 729 profiles were removed. There were nearly 38,000 samples in
backlog. Jan Bashinski, DNA Laboratory Monthly Statistics, CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., http://ag.ca.gov/bfs/pdf/Monthly.pdf (last visited Feb.
26,2011).
153. Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104,1108 (5th Cir. 2006).
154. Gabel, supra note 2, at 37.
155. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 32 (1988). The exception is where the
"abandonment" occurs within the curtilage, such as when a person tosses a half-smoked
cigarette into the trash at his home. State v. Reed, 641 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. Ct. App.
2007).
156. Cal. Att'y Gen. Memo, supra note 52.
157. Nakashima, supra note 146.
United States, Kansas investigators got a court order for a sample of
his daughter Kerri's Pap smear."' Without her knowledge,
investigators compared her samples to the crime scene evidence,
found a near-perfect match, and arrested her father."9 While Kerri
had "no problem" with the use of her Pap smear,1 it is reasonable to
assume that others may not share those sentiments.
There are obvious and significant differences between Lonnie
Franklin's pizza crust and Kerri Rader's Pap smear. First, California
investigators obtained a specimen from the actual suspect, whereas
Kansas investigators probed into a specimen from the suspect's child.
It is troubling that the suspicion of a particular person may grant
license to invade all other, presumably innocent, genetic relatives.
Also, Franklin discarded the waste in a manner consistent with
courts' interpretations of abandonment. Kerri, on the other hand,
turned over her genetic information to a medical clinic. Even if she
had been familiar with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act ("FERPA"), there is arguably a heightened expectation of
privacy. The Los Angeles police likely took special care in the Grim
Sleeper case, knowing that a successful apprehension would be highly
publicized and scrutinized. However, these precautions were
voluntary, and not in compliance with any statutory governance. In
other cases, it is foreseeable that law enforcement may blur the lines
as to what constitutes "abandonment." 6'
As more familial search investigations occur, law enforcement
may seek warrants to compel samples from pivots. If this were to
happen, genetic similarity on its face should not be enough to
constitute probable cause. Rather, there should a statutory scheme
that requires some corroborating evidence or some other
independent source of suspicion in support of an order to submit
biological information.'
158. Investigators had narrowed their suspects to Dennis Rader when computer
forensics found out that a document on a CD sent to a local television station had been
saved by a "Dennis" at a local church where Rader was the congregation's president.
They used an exemption in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act to obtain the
specimen from her university medical clinic. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. For example, when people donate blood they obviously do not have an
expectation of privacy. But does that make it appropriate for law enforcement to seize it
when they are pivots or even suspects? They likely had the expectation that it would not
be used for genetic profiling or that any information would be held criminally against
them.
162. Murphy, supra note 109, at 345-46.
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VI. Recommendations and Conclusions
The Court has held that the Constitution does not prohibit
certain kinds of intrusions, but there must be "precise and
discriminate procedures" to safeguard against abuse.63 If California's
protocol is to survive an imminent review at the Supreme Court, it
must institute specific guidelines or else risk legitimizing privacy
concerns. California citizens cannot always rely on law enforcement
to take extraordinary precautionary measures in these types of cases.
By defining expectations, the government can ensure that all
investigations are conducted properly and according to the public's
standards. The contrasts between Franklin and Garcia's
investigations and arrests illustrate the range in which familial DNA
testing may be implemented, and the need for more stringent
guidelines to narrow the scope of its use. *
As a way of eradicating the discriminatory tendencies of partial
match searching, analysts have suggested a nationwide database that
contains everybody's DNA profiles.1' But to propose this universal
intrusion would be akin to decriminalizing robbery to decrease crime
rates. While the intentions are understandable, the consequences
would be catastrophic. Furthermore, courts are unlikely to find any
reason compelling enough to trample the privacy rights of the entire
nation. Instead, the government should minimize the potential
negative effects of familial searching by creating a stricter and more
concrete statutory scheme to assist law enforcement in their
investigations.
A. Types of Crimes
First, familial testing should be specifically limited to the most
violent cases. Given the large number of violent crimes in California,
it should only be used in murders and rapes.'4 However, with over
10,000 murders and rapes in 2009, the potential field should be even
163. Id. at 339 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
164. Baxter, supra note 70.
165. Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 34, at 129. See also Akhil Reed Amar, A Safe
Intrusion, AM. LAw., June 2001, at 69; UK Police Chief Calls for National DNA Database,
393 NATURE 106 (1998); Teresa K. Baumann, Proxy Consent and a National DNA
Databank: An Unethical and Discriminatory Combination, 86 IOWA L. REV. 667, 675
(2001) (opposing national DNA data bank).
166. In 2009, there were 174,459 acts of violent crime in California. California Crime
Rates 1960-2010, DISASTER CTR., http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/cacrime.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2011).
further refined.' Following the strategy from the search for the Grim
Sleeper, I would suggest implementing partial match searches only
when multiple qualifying crimes can be linked to a single perpetrator.
Not to diminish the atrocity of the Santa Cruz crime, but if the
technology is to be used narrowly, it should be dedicated to the most
heinous ones. The minimum threshold can be determined and
reevaluated based on the practical outcomes. For example, if the
minimum is set at ten related crimes, investigators can use their
discretion to choose among the qualifying profiles. However, if after
time they find that the threshold is too cumbersome, they may seek to
lower it. Of course, there should be provisions to allow for
exceptional circumstances, such as assassinations or terrorist attacks.
Second, if investigators intend to pursue cold cases through
familial testing, there should be a clearer understanding of when a
case is "cold" enough, such as a minimum number of years lapsed.
To narrow the list further, police may consider setting a ceiling of
maximum number of years passed, absent a continuing pattern, in
order to focus on suspects that pose a continuing threat.
B. Restricted Database Searching
When trawling through its own database, California should
continue to limit the searches to offenders and exclude arrestees.
However, it is conceivable that the State will expand its searches into
other databases. If allowed, California should limit the scope to
states with the same or more stringent DNA collections. This
currently is not a major issue, since California is one of the most
liberal databases. However, there are people who advocate for
obtaining samples from individuals arrested for any crime.' Whether
or not there are plausible legal arguments for limiting the search,
preemptively limiting expansion to those of equivalent scope will
prevent against outcries of social or policy concerns.
C. Regulation of Investigations
The government should also elucidate guidelines for
investigations, including interactions with pivots, length and methods
of investigation, and protocol for dealing with particular situations.
As mentioned, DNA from pivots should be limited to voluntary
167. There were 1,972 murders and 8,713 forcible rapes. Id.
168. Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 34, at 129.
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relinquishment and should not allow for surreptitious retrieval.'
Pivots are entitled to their full privacy rights, since the fact that they
are a partial, as opposed to complete, match necessarily excludes
them as the actual suspect. Investigators should limit questioning of
the pivot in the absence of any supporting evidence. Talking to
neighbors, co-workers, or friends should be explicitly prohibited.
Simply sharing genetic information with a potential suspect does not
entitle investigators to raise the level of scrutiny. There should even
be precautions when looking at family members. Any investigation
should stay within the realm of public records and the pivot.
It may also be wise to create a suggested timeframe for
investigations. In contrast to the four days needed to catch the Grim
Sleeper, Santa Cruz police followed Garcia for months. While the
time necessary will undoubtedly vary among cases, there must be
precautions against wasting resources. When investigators in the
Grim Sleeper case believed that they had a suspect, they submitted
the information to the Attorney General for review.o However,
some question the appropriateness of this policy in the future, given
that the Attorney General may arguably share the same motivations
as the investigators."' As an alternative, such authority should be
divested either in the courts or in a committee. Requiring a judge to
review this information, similar to the way in which search warrants
are issued, may provide a more neutral process. However, the vast
number of courts statewide and the lack of communication among
them may lead to overuse. Especially without any written guidelines,
conditions for granting such requests will inevitably vary. A
committee is the best solution. 2 It would resolve issues of both
neutrality and consistency.
If investigators do discover a previously unknown genetic link, or
lack thereof, they should not reveal the information unless such
revelation is necessary for the apprehension of a suspect. Then
investigators should determine which party to tell. First, they should
169. See Part V.b.
170. Murphy, supra note 109. Though Attorney General Kamala Harris issued a press
release regarding Garcia's arrest, it is currently unclear whether she or former Attorney
General Brown had any personal involvement in the Santa Cruz partial match search.
News Release, Cal. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Attorney Gen., Santa Cruz Sex Assault
Suspect Identified Through Same DNA Technology Used in Grim Sleeper Case (Mar. 15,
2011), http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/print-release.php?id=2051.
171. Murphy, supra note 109.
172. Erin Murphy suggests a group made up of scientists, statisticians, executive
officers, and prosecuting and defense attorneys. Id. at 343.
look at the nature of the relationship: Adopted child, adopted sibling,
different father, etc. Then, they should consider the role of the pivot
and suspect within that relationship, whether either would already
know of the situation, and who else may know. For example, a
couple that adopted a child would already be aware of a lack of a
genetic link. On the other hand, a man may not know of the
existence of his son until a partial match search. In this situation, only
the suspect's mother, not the pivot or the suspect, may be aware of
the link. Even though it may seem rational to notify the
knowledgeable parties, investigators should be cautious in their
timing. If investigators reveal the information prior to the suspect's
arrest, there is the possibility that the relative may tip off the suspect,
making it more difficult to apprehend him. On the other hand, there
may be a societal, or at least a moral, benefit from a person
discovering the truth about his biological family from someone close
to him, rather than law enforcement. Every situation will be
different, and it would be impossible to create rigid guidelines for
every contingency. Rather, investigators should evaluate the
circumstances on a case-by-case basis using the aforementioned
factors.
D. Expungement
Perhaps the most crucial element, expungement procedures,
should be relaxed. There should be compulsory expungement for
arrestees who are not charged or are exonerated. With no legal
suspicion of guilt, there is no way to distinguish this group from "free
persons." Retaining their DNA is equivalent to collecting DNA from
an innocent person, for which there is no legitimate reason. At a
minimum, there should be automatic approval for petitions that meet
the minimum requirements. If a person qualifies to have his or her
DNA removed, there should be no room for a judge's discretion. If a
judge does deny a petition for some reason, there should be a proper
appeal process. A discretionary review with no appellate review does
not constitute a meaningful process. The government should also
consider compulsory expungement after a certain number of years,
for example 150 years."' After that point, retaining DNA no longer
meets any compelling reasons for deterrence, catching recidivists, or
173. I chose 150 years because the world's oldest man in modern times lived to be 138
years old, thus eliminating the problem of an elderly recidivist. World's oldest man dies at
the age of 138, MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/world
news/article-1047397/The-worlds-oldest-man-dies-age-138.html.
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exonerating an innocent person. One may argue that, for better or
worse, it may implicate the generations that do survive. But assuming
no perpetual acts of incest, the genes will continue to get diluted with
each new generation, making the chances of a significant number of
matching alleles highly unlikely.
E. Consistent Reevaluation
California may choose to implement all, some, or none of these
suggestions. At the very least, investigators should keep detailed
records and reports-with the exception of any identifying or private
data-and make them available to the public. This technology was
born controversial, and understanding the process can aid in an
educated and productive discussion on its future uses. Even if
searches are unsuccessful, knowing why can help in adjusting
parameters to maximize the potential and minimize the dangers.
With the recent successes in the Grim Sleeper and Santa Cruz cases,
many other states are looking to follow California's example. It is
incumbent upon California to set the best possible example by using
familial searches appropriately.
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